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DETERRING OPPORTUNISM THROUGH CLAWBACKS: LESSONS 
FOR EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION FROM MINOR LEAGUE 
BASEBALL 
INTRODUCTION 
Highly talented baseball players are scarce commodities. For this reason, 
they often command large sums of money prior to ever stepping on a major 
league baseball field, as teams annually pay large bonuses to the most talented 
players drafted in Major League Baseball’s (“MLB”) amateur draft. Combined, 
the thirty MLB teams awarded $228,009,050 in signing bonuses to 2011 
draftees.1 The most talented individuals—the first-round draftees—received on 
average $2,653,375 per player in 2011.2 Both numbers set records for 
spending, as did the $8 million bonus given to the number one overall pick, 
Gerrit Cole.3 
These sums of money are not given for performance but are given simply 
as an incentive to sign with the team. Teams view these expenditures as 
investments into the future of their organization, but the development of 
baseball players can be risky business.4 For instance, over the twenty-five 
drafts from 1981 to 2005, a total of 32.7 percent of the top draftees never 
played in the major leagues.5 Injuries frequently occurred, and players 
sometimes simply walked away from the game and retired after only a few 
years. When they did, they took their bonuses with them. 
In 2006, MLB recommended that teams protect these investments by using 
clawback provisions in initial minor league contracts.6 The practice quickly 
caught fire, and the clawback provision became an industry standard.7 The 
provision acts as a deterrent to opportunistic behavior,8 and, as will be seen 
 
 1. Jim Callis, No Matter the Slots, Teams Spent Freely in 2011, BASEBALL AM. (Aug. 18, 
2011), http://www.baseballamerica.com/today/draft/news/2011/2612233.html. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. See infra Part II.A.2. 
 5. Marty Dobrow, MLB draft can be risky business, ESPNBOSTON.COM, http://sports.espn. 
go.com/boston/columns/story?id=6628930 (last updated June 6, 2011). 
 6. Telephone Interview with Bobby Evans, Vice President of Baseball Operations, San 
Francisco Giants (Oct. 20, 2011). 
 7. See infra Part II.A.3. 
 8. See George M. Cohen, The Negligence-Opportunism Tradeoff in Contract Law, 20 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 941, 953–961 (1992) (discussing the doctrine of opportunism). 
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below, it is possible that both team and player benefit from this new 
contractual agreement. 
Just as clawbacks in baseball are a relatively new phenomenon, the general 
use of clawbacks in contracts is also a relatively new development. However, 
clawback clauses have increased dramatically in recent years, particularly in 
executive compensation contracts.9 Executive compensation clawbacks gained 
much attention with the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002.10 
Attention heightened when Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Act in 2010, 
which requires all publicly listed companies to now include clawback 
provisions in their executive compensation agreements.11 Yet despite the 
increased usage of clawbacks, they are not without critics. The study of them is 
still nascent, and many commentators question the utility and fundamental 
fairness of contractual clawbacks.12 
This Comment begins by discussing possible definitions offered for 
clawbacks and the evolution of their use in executive compensation 
agreements, both before and after the 2008 financial crisis. It continues by 
analyzing clawback provisions in minor league contracts. A discussion of the 
events leading to their widespread implementation in baseball will be followed 
by a discussion on their benefit from a law and economics perspective. Their 
enforceability will also briefly be addressed, as the use of these clawbacks in 
minor league contracts is not without some procedural unconscionability. 
As will become apparent, the use of prospective clawbacks in minor league 
contracts demonstrates the utility of clawbacks as a tool to protect risky 
investments, to deter opportunisitic behavior by reallocating risk, and to recoup 
losses after the exhibition of opportunistic behavior. Their increased usage 
should continue in other contractual realms where opportunism is possible, 
such as executive compensation agreements. 
 
 9. See, e.g., Jesse Fried & Nitzan Shilon, Excess-Pay Clawbacks, 36 J. CORP. L. 721, 723 
(2011) (stating that more than 80% of Fortune 100 firms began using clawbacks even before the 
Dodd-Frank Act required it); Matthew A. Melone, Adding Insult to Injury: The Federal Income 
Tax Consequences of the Clawback of Executive Compensation, 25 AKRON TAX J. 55, 120 (2010) 
(“Compensation clawback provisions are proliferating.”). 
 10. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 304, 15 U.S.C. § 7243 (2006). SOX allowed for the 
clawing back of executive bonuses in certain circumstances of wrongdoing. Id. 
 11. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 
954, 124 Stat. 1376, 1904 (2010). 
 12. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Dodd-Frank: Quack Federal Corporate Governance 
Round II, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1779, 1806 (2011) (stating that clawbacks are both overinclusive in 
some aspects and underinclusive in others); Michael C. Macchiarola, In the Shadow of the 
Omnipresent Claw: In Response to Professors Cherry & Wong, 95 MINN. L. REV. HEADNOTES 1, 
6 (2010), http://www.minnesotalawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/Macchiarola_ 
PDF1.pdf (stating that clawbacks are unnecessarily inflexible). 
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I.  CLAWBACKS GENERALLY 
A. Clawbacks Defined 
Though the usage of clawbacks has increased in the past decade, the study 
of them is still in its nascent stage.13 As a result, the term often assumes a 
different meaning depending on the context in which it is used.14 For instance, 
the meaning of the term clawback when used in an employment relocation 
contract will differ considerably from its meaning when used in the context of 
electronic discovery.15 
Black’s Law Dictionary supplies two potential meanings for clawback: 1) 
“[m]oney taken back”, or 2) “[t]he retrieval or recovery of tax allowances by 
additional forms of taxation.”16 Neither definition offers anything truly 
meaningful to the emerging doctrine of clawbacks. The simplicity and 
broadness of the first definition renders it nearly useless—it is almost limitless 
in its nature—while the second provides a more specific definition that is 
inapplicable to the more common modern usages of the term. 
Perhaps due to the lack of a consistent, useful definition of the term, 
Professors Cherry and Wong recently offered their own definition.17 They 
proposed “that a clawback be defined as a right to, or action for, the restitution 
of unfair enrichment that is otherwise justified or permitted under prevailing 
applicable law.”18 
Upon first glancing at this definition, one aspect immediately captures 
attention: the introduction of the concept of “unfair enrichment.” In discussing 
this term, Professors Cherry and Wong say that the concept of unfair 
enrichment is related to the more traditional contract concept of unjust 
 
 13. For a discussion of the scant availability of scholarly works concerning clawbacks, see, 
for example, Miriam A. Cherry & Jarrod Wong, Clawbacks: Prospective Contract Measures in 
an Era of Excessive Executive Compensation and Ponzi Schemes, 94 MINN. L. REV. 368, 410–
412 (2009), and Macchiarola, supra note 12, at 2. 
 14. Cherry & Wong, supra note 13, at 410–11. 
 15. Compare John Chung, Are Relocation Package “Claw Back” Clauses Legal in China?, 
CHINA LEGAL BRIEF (Mar. 17, 2011) (on file with the Saint Louis University Law Journal) 
(defining a clawback in a relocation agreement as a covenant requiring “the return of a portion or 
all of the relocation bonus, payment or similar payments paid by the company if the employees 
decide to leave the company within time periods specified in the agreement”), with Shira A. 
Scheindlin & Jonathan M. Redgrave, Special Masters and E-Discovery: The Intersection of Two 
Recent Revisions to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 347, 357 (2008) 
(defining a clawback as used in electronic discovery as an “agreement regarding a procedure for 
retrieving privileged information that has been inadvertently produced in the course of 
discovery”). 
 16. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 286 (9th ed. 2009). 
 17. Cherry & Wong, supra note 13, at 412. 
 18. Id. 
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enrichment, as both focus on the unjust nature of a person’s gains.19 Yet unfair 
enrichment extends beyond unjust enrichment to include instances in which 
“the person unfairly enriched has a preexisting legal right to payment.”20 Thus, 
because of a legal right, unjust enrichment would not apply and the offending 
person would be permitted to keep the benefit obtained, even if this were 
unjust to the other party. However, the concept of unfair enrichment offers a 
solution to this problem, as clawbacks offer the possibility of recouping all or 
part of this unfair enrichment. 
One might question whether this new concept is truly necessary, and, 
indeed, this proposed definition is not without critics. For instance, Professor 
Macchiarola recently remarked that the inclusion of unfair enrichment in the 
definition “introduces unwelcomed subjectivity to decisions of whether and to 
what extent a person’s monies might be subject to return at some future 
date.”21 He also contended that the predictability of law would suffer, and the 
transaction costs of contracting would rise.22 
It should be noted that Professors Cherry and Wong distinguish between 
two types of clawbacks that manage to co-exist within their definition.23 The 
first type, deemed a retroactive clawback, is imposed after the contractual right 
has arisen and after the benefit conferred.24 Conversely, a prospective 
clawback is introduced into a contract before the contractual right occurs and 
before the benefit conferred.25 
Prospective clawbacks operate more effectively than retroactive 
clawbacks,26 and many of the ills described by Professor Macchiarola 
disappear when clawbacks are used prospectively.27 Since the terms of the 
clawback result from the contractual process of drafting the provision, the 
uncertainties inherent in retroactive clawbacks disappear.28 Moreover, the 
parties have bargained for the terms in prospective clawbacks, so each side has 
had the opportunity to accept or reject the exact terms of the agreement. 
 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. at 413. 
 21. Macchiarola, supra note 12, at 7. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Cherry & Wong, supra note 13, at 371–72. 
 24. Id. at 372. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Miriam A. Cherry & Jarrod Wong, Reply: Clawback to the Future, 95 MINN. L. REV. 
HEADNOTES 19, 24 (2010), http://www.minnesotalawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/ 
Wong_Cherry_PDF.pdf. 
 28. Id. 
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B. Use of Clawbacks in Executive Compensation Agreements 
Whether done prospectively or retroactively, the usage of clawbacks has 
clearly increased in recent years.29 One prominent area in which clawbacks are 
now frequently used is in executive compensation agreements.30 Their usage in 
such agreements both before and after the 2008 financial crisis will be 
discussed below. 
1. Executive Compensation Clawbacks Prior to the 2008 Financial Crisis 
President Bush signed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (“SOX”) into law in 2002, 
and with it arrived the legal possibility of executive compensation clawbacks.31 
If a company is forced to issue an accounting restatement due to material 
noncompliance with a financial reporting requirement, the law allows the SEC 
to recoup any incentive-based compensation received within the twelve-month 
period preceding the restatement.32 
This provision, however, has its limitations. The clawing back is only 
permitted when the restatement results from misconduct.33 Also, only the 
budget-constrained SEC can initiate the clawback.34 For these and other 
reasons, the clawback provision of SOX was almost never used except when 
an executive was convicted of criminal fraud.35 
After the passage of SOX, some companies began voluntarily 
implementing their own clawback policies that went beyond the SOX 
requirements.36 In 2006, around eighteen percent of Fortune 100 firms utilized 
clawback provisions, and by the middle of 2010 the number of Fortune 100 
firms implementing clawbacks had grown to eighty percent.37 Close to fifty 
percent of Fortune 500 firms had implemented clawbacks by this date.38 
 
 29. Gretchen Morgenson, Pay It Back if You Didn’t Earn It, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 2008 
(Sunday Business), at 1. 
 30. See, e.g., Fried & Shilon, supra note 9, at 723 (stating that more than 80% of Fortune 
100 firms began using clawbacks even before the Dodd-Frank Act began requiring it); Melone, 
supra note 9, at 120 (“Compensation clawback provisions are proliferating.”). 
 31. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 304, 15 U.S.C. § 7243 (2006). 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Fried & Shilon, supra note 9, at 731. 
 35. Id.; see also Cherry & Wong, supra note 13, at 376–77 (stating that the clawback 
provision of SOX has “been largely ignored” and that only two enforcement actions were brought 
in the first seven years after the passage of the Act). But cf. Jeffrey S. Klein & Nicholas J. Pappas, 
New Clawback Requirements for Listed Public Companies, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 4, 2010, at 3 (noting 
that although the SEC has traditionally only initiated a clawback suit when the CEO or CFO is 
personally involved in the misconduct, the SEC has recently taken a more aggressive approach in 
regulating this issue). 
 36. Fried & Shilon, supra note 9, at 735–36. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at 736. 
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Nevertheless, most of these clawbacks lacked robust enforcement provisions, 
as they did not require directors to recoup excess pay, but instead granted 
directors discretionary powers.39 The majority of those that did require 
recoupment only did so when misconduct occurred.40 
The discretionary nature of these provisions severely limited their utility, 
as the personal cost to directors of instituting a recoupment procedure was 
likely to dwarf the personal benefit gained by directors from any type of 
recovery.41 Also, the misconduct hurdle further permitted excess pay to be 
hoarded by undeserving executives.42 Consequently, companies had little 
chance of recouping any excess pay despite the enactment of these provisions. 
2. Executive Compensation Clawbacks After the 2008 Financial Crisis 
On September 29, 2008, the Dow Jones Industrial Average dropped 778 
points.43 It was the largest single-day drop in the history of the widely used 
index, as $1.2 trillion in market value vanished in a matter of hours.44 As 
Warren Buffett would later say, the economy had “fallen off a cliff,” and the 
losses continued to mount.45 By March 9, 2009, the index had fallen to 
6547.0546—almost fifty-four percent below its all-time high of 14,164.53 
reached only seventeen months before.47 
Banks failed in large numbers, 48 home values catapulted downward,49 and 
the federal government scrambled to inject money into a failing financial 
system.50 The effort culminated with the enactment of the controversial 
Troubled Asset Relief Program (“TARP”) in October of 2008.51 
 
 39. Id. at 737. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Fried & Shilon, supra note 9, at 739. 
 42. Id. at 741. 
 43. Vikas Bajaj & Michael M. Grynbaum, 7% Drop in Dow, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2008, at 
A1. 
 44. See id. 
 45. Betsy Stark, Tracking the Dow One Year After Rock Bottom, ABC NEWS (Mar. 9, 2010), 
http://abcnews.go.com/Business/year-ago-today-dow-hit-bottom-recession/story?id=10046578. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) History Chart: January 1, 1931 Through August 
12, 2011, http://www.nyse.tv/djia-chart-history.htm (last visited June 10, 2012). 
 48. See Bank Failures in Brief, FDIC, http://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/bank/2009/ (last 
updated Jan. 20, 2012) (reporting that 140 banks failed in 2009 alone). 
 49. Les Christie, Home Prices: ‘Double-dip’ Confirmed, CNNMONEY (May 31, 2011, 10:43 
AM), http://money.cnn.com/2011/05/31/real_estate/march_home_prices/index.htm. 
 50. Among the many measures taken, almost $200 billion was extended to mortgage lenders 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in September of 2008. David Ellis, U.S. Seizes Fannie and Freddie, 
CNNMONEY (Sept. 7, 2008, 8:28 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2008/09/07/news/companies/fan 
nie_freddie/index.htm. Additionally, insurance giant AIG received $85 billion the same month. 
Matthew Karnitschnig et al., U.S. to Take Over AIG in $85 Billion Bailout; Central Banks Inject 
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TARP placed limits on executive compensation for those financial 
companies receiving funds from the program.52 However, it wasn’t until the 
passage of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 that an 
attempt was made to claw back portions of excess bonuses paid out with funds 
from TARP.53 The statute required the recovery “of any bonus, retention 
award, or incentive compensation paid to a senior executive officer and any of 
the next [twenty] most highly-compensated employees . . . based on [financial 
statements] that are later found to be materially inaccurate.”54 Yet the Act also 
stated that it would not prohibit the paying of a bonus for employment 
contracts executed prior to February 11, 2009.55 
The effect of the TARP clawback requirement was muted.56 Kenneth 
Feinberg, nominated by President Obama to be the “watchdog” for executive 
pay, found in 2010 that seventeen companies paid out $1.6 billion in bonuses 
after receiving bailout money the previous year.57 Though he remarked the 
bonuses were paid in “bad judgment,” he also noted that “they didn’t violate 
any statute, they didn’t violate any regulation at the time.”58 He also remarked 
that “[t]he taxpayer has a right to be outraged.”59 
In response to this report and the public’s outrage, President Obama 
reemphasized the importance of financial reform legislation.60 In fact, just days 
before the Feinberg report surfaced, President Obama signed into law the 
 
Cash as Credit Dries Up, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 16, 2008), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1221565 
61931242905.html. 
 51. Greg Hitt & Deborah Solomon, Historic Bailout Passes as Economy Slips Further, 
WALL ST. J. (Oct. 4, 2008), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122304922742602533.html. 
 52. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 § 111, 12 U.S.C. § 5221 (2006 & Supp. 
IV 2008) (providing required guidelines for a company receiving bailout funds); see also Hitt & 
Solomon, supra note 51. For a more in-depth discussion of the subsequent bailouts, see Steven L. 
Schwarcz, Protecting Financial Markets: Lessons from the Subprime Mortgage Meltdown, 93 
MINN. L. REV. 373 (2008). 
 53. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 7001, 123 Stat. 
115, 516–520 (2009) (amending the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008). 
 54. Id. at 517. 
 55. Id. at 518. 
 56. See Cherry & Wong, supra note 13, at 385 (noting that the Act was weak and ineffective 
in limiting compensation); see also Mark Maremont & Joann S. Lublin, Loopholes Sap Potency 
of Pay Limits, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 6, 2009), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB12338735231015424 
1.html (describing the loopholes of the TARP requirements). 
 57. Matthew Jaffe, ‘Right to be Outraged:’ Pay Czar Slams Banks for Executive Pay After 
Bailouts, ABC NEWS (July 23, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/pay-czar-report-slams-
banks-executive-pay-bailouts/story?id=11235894. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
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Dodd-Frank Act of 2010.61 With it came the requirement of clawbacks in 
executive compensation agreements.62 
3. Clawbacks Required by the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 
The Dodd-Frank Act requires all publicly listed companies to include 
clawbacks prospectively in their incentive compensation packages.63 The 
clawback provision triggers when a company is forced to prepare an 
accounting restatement due to a material noncompliance.64 More specifically, 
the company must recover incentive-based compensation from executive 
officers derived from 1) erroneous data; 2) received during a “[three]-year 
period preceding the date on which the issuer is required to prepare an 
accounting restatement”; 3) in excess of the pay that would have resulted under 
the restatement.65 The clawback must be strong enough to allow the company 
to recover any compensation that executives derive from erroneous data in 
excess of what would have been paid under the restatement.66 
One of the chief benefits of this requirement is that it forces companies to 
include clawbacks that trigger whether or not the executive engages in any 
misconduct.67 This represents a difference—and an improvement68—from 
SOX, which required misconduct and lessened the likelihood that the provision 
would ever be enforced.69 However, the Act has been criticized for only 
requiring clawbacks that trigger when an accounting restatement is issued.70 
Furthermore, it might permit executives “to keep excess pay arising from the 
sale of equity incentives at inflated prices.”71 Also, some have commented that 
 
 61. Helene Cooper, Obama Signs Contentious Overhaul of the Financial System, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 22, 2010, at B3. 
 62. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 
954, 124 Stat. 1376, 1904 (2010); see also Fried & Shilon, supra note 9, at 745 (stating that 
section 954 of Dodd-Frank requires every listed company to put in place a clawback policy). 
 63. Dodd-Frank Act § 954. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Fried & Shilon, supra note 9, at 746. 
 68. Not all would agree that this is an improvement. In fact, Professor Bainbridge describes 
the Dodd-Frank clawback as “seriously flawed” partly because the requirement will over-
inclusively result in some innocent executive officers forfeiting pay despite their lack of 
responsibility. Bainbridge, supra note 12, at 1806. 
 69. Fried & Shilon, supra note 9, at 730. 
 70. Id. at 747–48. Professors Fried and Shilon state that “[a] restatement requirement is 
problematic because an executive could receive excess pay even if a restatement is not considered 
to be required.” Id. at 748. This could be for one of three reasons: 1) a small accounting error 
would not necessarily require a restatement but could trigger a large compensation bonus; 2) a 
firm may use non-financial metrics in calculating an executive’s bonus; or 3) a firm may find that 
a restatement isn’t necessary even though neutral observers would believe the contrary. Id. 
 71. Id. at 751. 
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the Act lacks a procedural mechanism for enforcement.72 It remains possible 
that this latter concern might be alleviated once the SEC, as the agency 
charged with implementing the Act, develops its rules for the clawback 
requirement.73 However, the SEC has yet to adopt rules for this portion of the 
Act.74 
For this reason, some have suggested that firms should go beyond the 
requirements of the Dodd-Frank Act and voluntarily institute more robust 
clawback provisions.75 The clawback could be written in a way that not only 
complies with Dodd-Frank requirements, but also allows for a broader 
approach that covers unanticipated events.76 In this manner, the clawback 
would be mandatory in some circumstances, and in other circumstances the 
board of directors could be given broad discretion in dealing with “inevitable, 
real-world variation.”77 
C. Are There Problems with Using Clawbacks? 
As demonstrated above, the usage of clawbacks in areas such as executive 
compensation has increased in recent years. In fact, with the passage of Dodd-
Frank, prospective clawbacks have become a legal requirement for companies. 
While many would cheer this development, others find problems with this 
increased usage. 
Some have remarked that the entire arrival of clawbacks reflects a 
reactionary approach. For instance, the passage of SOX took place hastily in 
 
 72. Cherry & Wong, supra note 27, at 22 (expressing concerns that a shareholder derivative 
suit might be needed to actually claw back the compensation). 
 73. Cf. Klein & Pappas, supra note 35, at 9. (discussing the possibility of the SEC adopting 
rules for de minimis clawbacks similar to that adopted in TARP regulation). 
 74. Implementing Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act—
Upcoming Activity, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/dodd-frank/dfactivity-upcoming.shtml 
(last visited Feb. 12, 2012) (stating that rules regarding the recovery of executive compensation 
were planned for implementation between July 2012 and December 2012). 
 75. See Cherry & Wong, supra note 27, at 22–23 (stating the Dodd-Frank Act “certainly 
could be stronger” and that companies are free to go beyond the requirements); Fried & Shilon, 
supra note 9, at 749 (stating all firms should include clawback provisions that will trigger 
whether a restatement is necessary or not). But see Bainbridge, supra note 12, at 1815–16 
(finding no utility in any of the corporate governance measures included in Dodd-Frank since 
corporate governance flaws were not a cause of the financial crisis). 
 76. Ben W. Heineman, Jr., Making Sense of Clawbacks and Holdbacks, BLOOMBERG 
BUSINESSWEEK (Aug. 13, 2010, 2:59 PM), http://www.businessweek.com/managing/content/aug 
2010/ca20100813_666706.htm. 
 77. Id. Of course, granting a board of directors such discretion might limit the utility of any 
clawback provision, as it will make it unlikely that the board will ever exercise this discretion in a 
manner adverse to management. 
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the wake of Enron and other corporate fiascos.78 Similarly, the drafting and 
passage of Dodd-Frank took place as a reaction to the 2008 financial crisis.79 
Consequently, some see Congress as quickly acquiescing to public pressure, 
and perhaps recklessly enacting unnecessary and destructive legislation simply 
to appease mass outrage.80 
In addition to these reactionary concerns, others express concerns over the 
increase in uncertainty that clawbacks add.81 In a world of compensation 
uncertainty, an executive will constantly be “monitoring the rear view mirror” 
and will never be “free to relax.”82 Moreover, the valuation difficulties that 
may lead to the clawback-inducing problem in the first place will likely still be 
present at a later date.83 At this later date, any evaluation might also be affected 
by hindsight bias.84 
There might also be practical difficulties in getting a person to pay back 
money when enforcing a clawback, as checks are cashed quickly and money 
spent even quicker.85 Additionally, an overly aggressive clawback provision 
might stifle beneficial risk-taking and hamper the recruitment of new corporate 
talent.86 Lastly, a clawback may result in unfair tax implications.87 
While some of these concerns might be legitimate, the utility of clawbacks 
outweighs the potential drawbacks, as another industry far from Wall Street 
demonstrates. The industry? Professional baseball, whose franchises frequently 
utilize clawbacks to protect bonus-laden contracts and to tame opportunistic 
behavior. 
II.  CLAWBACKS IN MINOR LEAGUE CONTRACTS 
A. The Origin of Clawbacks in Baseball Contracts 
Each year as MLB teams seek to reload and upgrade the young talent 
within their organizations, large bonuses are paid to previously amateur 
 
 78. See Leo E. Strine, Jr., Breaking the Corporate Governance Logjam in Washington: Some 
Constructive Thoughts on a Responsible Path Forward, 63 BUS. LAW. 1079, 1081 (2008) 
(describing SOX as “crisis-inspired legislation”). 
 79. See Bainbridge, supra note 12, at 1782–83 (stating that “populist outrage motivated 
Congress to pass the Dodd-Frank [Act] . . .”). 
 80. See id. at 1786 (stating that congressional intrusion into corporate governance occurs in a 
cycle of “boom, bust, and regulation,” and SOX and Dodd-Frank were simply the latest iterations 
of this). 
 81. Macchiarola, supra note 12, at 7. 
 82. Id. at 7–8. 
 83. Id. at 15. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Melone, supra note 9, at 72. 
 87. Id. at 75. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2012] DETERRING OPPORTUNISM THROUGH CLAWBACKS 195 
players. As noted in the Introduction, the thirty MLB teams combined to award 
$228,009,050 in signing bonuses to 2011 draftees,88 most being between the 
age of eighteen and twenty-one. This total amount did not include the large 
sums of money spent on Latin American players,89 who are not subject to 
MLB’s Rule 4 draft.90 The very top draftees annually command signing 
bonuses in the millions of dollars, with this year’s number one pick in the Rule 
4 draft, Gerrit Cole, netting an $8 million signing bonus.91 
Despite the large sums of money paid upfront to amateur players, the 
investment remains risky.92 These young players possess the impressive talent 
that leads to the ability to command large signing bonuses, yet many fail to 
blossom as projected. Incredibly, of the 917 first-round draft picks from the 
twenty-five year period between 1981 and 2005, 32.7% never played in the 
major leagues.93 Furthermore, 19.2% of the total top-ten overall picks from the 
same time period—the most talented draftees of all—never reached the major 
leagues.94 Most incredibly, two of the number one overall selections never 
even stepped on a major league diamond.95 
These picks represent the best of the best—players who have been vetted 
almost as extensively as Supreme Court nominees.96 Faced with such a risky 
 
 88. Callis, supra note 1. 
 89. MLB teams spent an estimated $102 million on Latino signing bonuses for the year 
ending in 2010. Kevin Baxter, Latin American Baseball Players Train Hard to Build English 
Skills, L.A. TIMES, June 30, 2011, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jun/30/sports/la-
sp-0701-baseball-esl-classes-20110701/2. 
 90. For a thorough discussion of MLB’s current draft system and the possible legal problems 
that result from excluding certain players from the draft based on nationality, see Daniel 
Hauptman, The Need for a Worldwide Draft to Level the Playing Field and Strike Out the 
National Origin Discrimination in Major League Baseball, 30 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 263 
(2009–10). See also Jim Callis, MLB’s Amateur Attitude is Baffling, BASEBALL AM. (July 13, 
2011), http://www.baseballamerica.com/online/prospects/column/2011/2612097.html (discussing 
the differences between the process for acquiring international talent and for acquiring domestic 
talent, and discussing the continued escalation of international signing bonuses within a free 
market system). 
 91. Callis, supra note 1. 
 92. Dobrow, supra note 5. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Brien Taylor, picked by the New York Yankees in 1991, and Matt Bush, picked by the 
San Diego Padres in 2004, never reached the major leagues. Id. 
 96. Each team has a legion of “bird dogs,” area scouts, cross-checkers, international scouts, 
and assistant general managers that constantly assess amateur talent. Top prospects are usually 
observed over a period of several years by multiple people within an organization before being 
selected. See, e.g., Amalie Benjamin, Search Party: Red Sox Scouts are Always on the Lookout 
for Talent, BOS. GLOBE, Dec. 28, 2008, available at http://articles.boston.com/2008-12-
28/sports/29272903_1_scouts-minor-leagues-draft (describing the incessant scouting process 
employed by the Boston Red Sox). 
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investment, MLB has tried a number of measures, with the primary approach 
to the problem97 focusing on efforts to suppress signing bonuses. 
1. MLB’s Efforts to Suppress Signing Bonuses 
Major League Baseball has long engineered various mechanisms to curtail 
signing bonuses of amateur athletes. As long ago as 1946, MLB instituted a 
bonus rule that required a team to place any player signed to a bonus above a 
fixed amount (often $4,000 to $6,000) on the major league roster.98 With only 
a limited amount of major league roster spots, baseball executives hoped this 
would deter teams from signing numerous amateur players to bonuses above 
the threshold.99 
Despite this rule, teams continued to spend on top talent, prompting the 
adoption of a new rule in 1959.100 Deemed the “first-year draft rule,” it 
required teams to protect their top prospects on the equivalent of an expanded 
major league roster or else risk losing the players to other teams.101 When this 
too failed to curb bonuses, the teams resorted to a more drastic measure: a 
formal draft.102 
MLB established the Rule 4 draft in 1965.103 Much like today,104 teams 
selected draft picks in a set order and had exclusive negotiating rights with 
their selections. Since teams were no longer free to compete with one another 
for top talent, the draft immediately depressed signing bonuses.105 While five 
 
 97. Many would argue that, despite the risky investment, this is not a problem at all, as 
acquiring talent through signing amateur players still remains the most cost-effective means of 
acquiring talent. See Kevin Baxter, Talent Search Goes Out of States, L.A. TIMES, June 18, 2011, 
at C5 (discussing the cost-efficiencies of signing and developing international amateur players); 
Andrew Keh, For Mets, Different Approach Pays Off, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 2011, at B13 
(discussing the New York Mets’ new approach to paying premium dollars for amateur players 
since it is the “most cost-efficient way for a team to acquire talent”). 
 98. Allan Simpson, Despite Baseball’s Best Efforts, Bonuses Just Keep Growing, BASEBALL 
AM., June 20–July 3, 2005, at 10. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at 11. 
 101. Id. at 10–11. The rule allowed players to be protected on a “40-man” roster, as opposed 
to the normal active roster consisting of twenty-five players. Id. If a prospect were not placed on 
the 40-man roster, he would be subject to acquisition via waivers or the Rule 5 draft. Id. A system 
with many modifications and differences from this 1959 system still exists. See Kary Booher, 
Explaining the Rule 5 Draft, BASEBALL AM. (Nov. 20, 2008), http://www.baseballameri 
ca.com/today/majors/news/2008/267230.html (describing the Rule 5 draft process). 
 102. Simpson, supra note 98. 
 103. Id. 
 104. For a description of current rules, see First-Year Player Draft, Official Rules, 
MLB.COM, http://mlb.mlb.com/mlb/draftday/rules.jsp (last visited June 20, 2012). 
 105. Simpson, supra note 98. 
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players in 1964 had signed six-figure bonuses, only the number one overall 
pick commanded such a bonus in 1965.106 
For more than two decades, the depressed bonuses persisted. In fact, in 
1987, the highly talented Ken Griffey, Jr.—the number one overall pick—
signed with the Seattle Mariners for a mere $169,000 bonus.107 It seemed MLB 
had solved its problem of escalating signing bonuses, yet the solution proved 
temporary. 
Soon after Griffey signed, bonuses began to escalate again. The year 1989 
marked a dramatic intensification of negotiation, with rising super-agent Scott 
Boras securing a $350,000 bonus for Ben McDonald.108 Only a few years later 
in 1993, Boras secured an astounding $1.55 million bonus for a high school 
lefty named Brien Taylor.109 Average bonus payments to first-round picks 
skyrocketed from $252,577 in 1990 to $613,037 in 1993.110 And the escalation 
did not cease there. 
In 1996, Boras and other agents used a loophole in the draft process to 
allow four draft-eligible players to become free agents.111 Once on the open 
market, the players freely negotiated with all major league teams. The result: 
Matt White inked a $10.2 million bonus with the Tampa Bay Devil Rays.112 
The other three players inked deals of $10 million, $6.075 million, and $3 
million.113 
Faced with this escalation, MLB again sought new methods of depressing 
signing bonuses. In 2000, MLB instituted signing bonus guidelines (or 
recommendations) to teams in the form of “soft slotting.”114 For each pick in 
 
 106. Id. 
 107. Ross Newhan, Costly Draft Could Leave Some Teams Cold, L.A. TIMES, June 1, 1997, at 
C12. 
 108. Simpson, supra note 98. The $350,000 bonus was part of an overall package worth 
$824,300. Id. Another player, John Olerud, received a $575,000 bonus as part of an $800,000 
package the same year. Id.; see also Bob Nightengale, Only the Money is Guaranteed, USA 
TODAY, June 3, 2009, at 1C. (comparing Ben McDonald to Stephen Strasburg, who was also 
represented by Scott Boras twenty years later). 
 109. Simpson, supra note 98; Jim Bowden, The GM’s Office: Negotiating with Scott Boras, 
ESPN (June 4, 2011), http://m.espn.go.com/mlb/story?storyId=6625521&pg=1&wjb=. 
 110. Simpson, supra note 98. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. MLB could not make the slotting recommendations mandatory, as such a change 
would need to be established through collective bargaining with the Major League Baseball 
Players Association. MLB executives still seek mandatory slotting today, and the issue was 
discussed during the 2011 collective bargaining talks. See Callis, supra note 90 (noting that MLB 
wanted a hard slotting system); Jon Heyman, Draft Maneuvers by Nationals, Pirates Drawing the 
Ire of Selig, SI.COM, http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2011/writers/jon_heyman/08/19/draft-cap/in 
dex.html (last updated Aug. 19, 2011, 4:01PM) (stating that Commissioner Selig’s biggest 
interest in the 2011 negotiations was a new slotting system). It was not expected to be included in 
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the first five rounds, MLB provided teams with specific bonus 
recommendations, and for each pick after the fifth round, a flat cap on bonuses 
was instituted.115 Teams were pressured to stay within the recommended bonus 
levels for each of the top picks in the draft.116 Nevertheless, the guidelines 
were not mandatory.117 Although the soft slotting system curbed the escalation 
in signing bonuses,118 it did not depress them.119 For this reason, MLB teams 
began to turn to other measures in order to protect their investments. 
2. The Impetus for Clawback Clauses in Minor League Contracts 
Despite the increase in signing bonuses, teams continued to retain little 
protection for their large, risky investments. Like other professional sports, 
injuries unexpectedly stifled the anticipated brilliance of many talented 
signees.120 Other things also unexpectedly limited player development, as, in 
fact, sometimes players simply chose to walk away from the game. 
Ryan Jaroncyk perhaps best exemplifies this phenomenon. Drafted in the 
first round by the New York Mets in 1995, Jaroncyk netted an $850,000 
signing bonus.121 He had all the physical assets to be a major league 
 
the next agreement. Jim Callis, Jim Callis Chat: Aug. 17, BASEBALL AM. (Aug. 17, 2011), 
http://www.baseballamerica.com/today/prospects/chat/2011/2612226.html (stating that the 
prospect for hard slotting was next to zero). 
 115. Jim Callis, Prospects Chat with Jim Callis, BASEBALL AM. (June 16, 2010), 
http://www.baseballamerica.com/today/prospects/chat/2010/2610204.html. 
 116. See Callis, supra note 1 (stating that in 2011 MLB “leaned on teams harder than ever to 
adhere to an informal slotting system” and that “political pressure” is exerted on clubs “to toe the 
line”). 
 117. See Kevin Goldstein, Future Shock: Do We Really Need to ‘Fix’ the Draft?, BASEBALL 
PROSPECTUS (Aug. 20, 2010), http://www.baseballprospectus.com/article.php?articleid=11804 
(describing the lack of an enforcement mechanism in soft slotting). 
 118. Since soft slotting was instituted in 2000, first-round bonuses have increased by 2.3% 
per year, compared to an increase of 26.9% per year in the 1990s. Callis, supra note 90. 
 119. Major League Baseball and the players’ union agreed in a new collective bargaining 
agreement, effective in December 2011, to make major changes to the Rule 4 draft. MLB, MLBPA 
Reach New Five-Year Labor Agreement, MLB.COM (Nov. 22, 2011, 1:20 PM), 
http://mlb.mlb.com/news/article.jsp?ymd=20111122&content_id=26025138&vkey=pr_mlb&c_id
=mlb. Each team will be provided a pool of money to spend on draft picks selected in the top ten 
rounds. Id. The pools will be calculated based upon a team’s specific draft picks and teams who 
exceed their allotted spending pool will be penalized. Id. While not the equivalent of mandatory 
slotting, the new system is still more binding than the previous “soft slotting” system due to the 
enforcement mechanism of penalty taxes. See J.J. Cooper & Jim Callis, New CBA Will Bring 
Sweeping Changes to Talent Acquisition, BASEBALL AM. (Dec. 20, 2011), http://www.baseball 
america.com/today/draft/news/2012/2612723.html (detailing the penalty tax scheme). 
 120. Cf. Dobrow, supra note 5 (noting that a total of 32.7 percent of the top draftees between 
1981 and 2005 never made the major leagues). 
 121. Buster Olney, A Met Prospect Walks Away from Baseball, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 1997, at 
B7. The bonus also included a $100,000 college scholarship plan. Id. 
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shortstop.122 But he lacked one mental tool that would overshadow all of his 
physical talents: he had no desire to play the game.123 
Despite the physical attributes and the large bonus, Jaroncyk said that he 
“always thought [baseball] was boring.”124 So at the ripe age of twenty years, 
just two years after signing his contract and being completely healthy, he 
walked away from what he considered to be a “boring” game.125 He never set 
foot on a major league baseball field, and the Mets never recovered a dime of 
their investment.126 
Though uncommon, others would follow Jaroncyk’s lead and join him in 
the land of lost prospects. Jaroncyk, who once remarked that he “play[ed] for 
God,”127 would be joined in his deistic pursuit by Grant Desme, who retired 
from baseball on the verge of stardom to become a priest.128 Justin Hoyman, a 
2004 second-round pick by the Cleveland Indians who received a $725,000 
signing bonus,129 played all of two seasons in the minor leagues before 
promptly retiring.130 Quan Cosby, who received an $825,000 bonus as an 
eighteen-year-old in 2001, also left the game after a short career in the minor 
leagues.131 Cosby’s reason? He wanted to play football for the University of 
Texas.132 Another former prospect, Tom Wilhelmsen, received $250,000 in 
2002 from the Milwaukee Brewers as an eighteen-year-old. He filed retirement 
papers in 2005 after “a lot of beer and grass.”133 
Many might be wondering why a talented player would ever walk away 
from baseball so early in his career. While the answer might vary greatly from 
individual to individual, it no doubt stems in part from the fact that almost all 
 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Olney, supra note 121. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Jane Lee, Desme Retires to Pursue Priesthood, MLB.COM (Jan. 22, 2010, 8:08 PM), 
http://mlb.mlb.com/news/article.jsp?ymd=20100122&content_id=7954958. 
 129. Baseball America Draft Database, 2004 MLB Draft: Round 2, BASEBALL AM., 
http://www.baseballamerica.com/draftdb/rnd.php?rnd=2 (last visited Oct. 22, 2011). 
 130. Justin Hoyman, THE BASEBALL CUBE, http://www.thebaseballcube.com/players/pro 
file.asp?P=Justin-Hoyman (last visited Oct. 22, 2011). Hoyman might not be considered a pure 
runaway, as his brief career was limited by an elbow injury. Kevin T. Czerwinski, Back to School 
with Justin Hoyman, MLB.COM (Feb. 27, 2006, 11:27 AM), http://www.minorleaguebase 
ball.com/news/article.jsp?ymd=20060227&content_id=43772&vkey=news_milb&fext=.jsp. 
 131. Player Profile, Quan Cosby, CBSSPORTS.COM, http://www.cbssports.com/nfl/draft/play 
ers/565752 (last visited Oct. 22, 2011). 
 132. Id. 
 133. Geoff Baker, Pitcher Thriving in 2nd Chance, SEATTLE TIMES, Feb. 18, 2011, at C1; 
Bob Harkins, Partied His Way Out, Then Got 2nd Chance, NBC SPORTS (Mar. 8, 2011, 12:51 
PM), http://nbcsports.msnbc.com/id/41925004/ns/sports-baseball/. In 2010, Wilhelmsen began a 
comeback attempt with another team. Harkins, supra note 133. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
200 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 57:185 
prospects spend years in baseball’s minor leagues prior to reaching the major 
leagues. Though a full discussion is beyond the scope of this Article, the minor 
league lifestyle is less than glamorous.134 The tiresome travel, most of which is 
done by bus, grates on players.135 Many young players become homesick from 
being away from home for the first time.136 And of course, some, like Jaroncyk 
above, simply lack a love for the game. Whatever the reason, baseball 
executives soon realized they needed to better protect their risky investments. 
Consequently, teams began turning to clawbacks. 
3. The Introduction of Clawback Provisions in Minor League Contracts 
In 2006, MLB’s Office of the Commissioner of Baseball responded to the 
multiple incidents of young prospects retiring after only a few seasons. The 
office distributed new recommended minor league contract language to the 
thirty MLB teams.137 The language included a clawback provision to help 
protect teams’ investments.138 
Recognizing the utility of these provisions, teams quickly added the 
language to their uniform player contracts (“UPCs”). By 2007—only a year 
later—nearly all teams had begun utilizing the provisions.139 Moreover, due to 
the top-down process of incorporation, in which the central office offered 
recommended language and teams quickly adopted it, the provisions all looked 
remarkably similar. This will be discussed more in the next section. 
 
 134. For a discussion of the living environment of players in the minor leagues, see Garrett 
Broshuis, Playing for Peanuts, BASEBALL AM. (Mar. 31, 2010), http://www.baseballameri 
ca.com/today/minors/season-preview/2010/269689.html. 
 135. See Garrett Broshuis, Postcards from the Bushes, THE SPORTING NEWS, July 21, 2006, 
at 69 (describing the feeling of sleeping on a bus like a contortionist). 
 136. See id. (providing thoughts of missing home during a long season). 
 137. Telephone Interview with Bobby Evans, supra note 6. Because of antitrust exemptions 
and the absence of a minor league players union, MLB can unilaterally recommend contract 
language without going through collective bargaining; most teams subsequently implement it. See 
James T. Masteralexis & Lisa P. Masteralexis, If You’re Hurt, Where is Home? Recently Drafted 
Minor League Baseball Players are Compelled to Bring Workers’ Compensation Action in 
Team’s Home State or in Jurisdiction More Favorable to Employers, 21 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 
575, 575–76 (2011) (describing the unilateral implementation of workers’ compensation clauses 
into minor league UPCs). 
 138. Telephone Interview with Bobby Evans, supra note 6. 
 139. This information was obtained by reviewing more than forty minor league contracts 
from the relevant time period. However, the implementation of the provisions was not 
unanimous. In fact, the St. Louis Cardinals decided not to utilize the provisions at all. Email 
Interview with John Mozeliak, Vice President and General Manager of Baseball Operations, St. 
Louis Cardinals (Jan. 14, 2011). The Cardinals still do not use them, because they rarely have a 
need for clawbacks and prefer greater tax flexibility. Id. 
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B. The Various Clawbacks Used by MLB Teams 
The clawback provisions instituted by MLB teams all lie within an 
addendum to the UPCs that they utilize.140 At their most basic level, they all 
operate similarly; they allow a team to recoup a portion of a player’s bonus if a 
certain event occurs to trigger the recoupment clause. The triggering event 
usually involves either the failure to report to a playing assignment or an 
unexcused leave of absence longer than a period of a few weeks. 
However, some differences exist in the operational length of the 
provisions. Accordingly, two clubs’ provisions will be examined in more 
detail, with one provision extending the full length of the contract and the other 
being a moderate length provision. 
1. The New York Yankees’ Provision Allows Recoupment over the 
Entire Length of the UPC 
The New York Yankees include a clawback provision in an addendum to 
their minor league UPCs that allows for the recoupment of a portion of the 
signing bonus for the full-length of the agreement.141 The exact wording of this 
provision is included in Appendix A. 
Subpart 2, concerning the operational aspect of the clawback, is 
particularly relevant.142 If the triggering event occurs, the team can recoup a 
portion of the bonus according to the following formula: the signing bonus 
paid to the player is multiplied by the number of seasons remaining on the 
player’s contract and then divided by the length of the contract. 
An example might further clarify this formula. The initial contracts signed 
by minor leaguers almost always span seven years. If a player plays two 
seasons before the triggering event occurs, the above-described formula allows 
the team to recoup five-sevenths of the already paid signing bonus. To use 
Jaroncyk as a hypothetical, this provision would have allowed the team to 
recoup $607,142.86 of his $850,000 signing bonus since he retired after only 
two years.143 If he had instead played five seasons instead of two, the team 
could have still recouped two-sevenths, or $242,857.14, of the bonus. This 
 
 140. This addendum, Addendum B, is one of the only parts of the contract that is negotiable, 
as altering other portions of the contract is discouraged. See David M. Szuchman, Note, Step Up 
to the Bargaining Table: A Call for the Unionization of Minor League Baseball, 14 HOFSTRA 
LAB. L.J. 265, 281–82, 287–90 (1996) (discussing the parts of minor league contracts that are 
negotiable and also discussing the mechanics of the draft and baseball’s antitrust exemption in 
great detail). 
 141. First-year minor league player agreements, with very few exceptions, last for seven 
seasons (the equivalent of roughly seven years). Szuchman, supra note 140, at 282. 
 142. Paragraph 1 of the provision also allows for the relinquishment of any right to an unpaid 
signing bonus, though this will rarely come into effect since the full amount of signing bonuses 
are usually paid within two years. See infra Appendix A. 
 143. Olney, supra note 121. 
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would have been a significant deterrent to leaving the game prior to the 
expiration of the agreement, and certainly a deterrent to leaving early in the 
agreement. 
2. The San Diego Padres Utilize a More Moderate Length Clawback 
Provision 
While the Yankees’ clawback extends the full length of the agreement, 
other teams extend the provision for a more moderate length. The San Diego 
Padres, for instance, include a clawback provision lasting only the first three 
years of the seven-year agreement.144 The actual provision is included in 
Appendix B. The language of the clawback remains strikingly similar to the 
Yankees’ provision with the exception of the second paragraph. In this 
paragraph, the language clearly states that the “Recoupment Period” will only 
last for the first three seasons of the UPC. The formula used to calculate the 
recoupment amount remains the same. 
This change in language becomes very important. While Jaroncyk would 
be subjected to the same clawback under either provision since he only played 
two seasons, some of the other players described above would not be subjected 
to any clawback at all. For instance, Quan Cosby played four minor league 
seasons before choosing to play football at Texas.145 Under the Yankees’ 
provision, he would be subjected to a clawback of three-sevenths of his bonus, 
but under the Padres’ provision he would be subjected to no clawback at all, as 
the three-year recoupment period would have expired. 
As demonstrated, the difference between the provisions can potentially be 
significant. Nevertheless, there are more overall similarities between the 
provisions—and between all provisions used by MLB teams—than there are 
differences. Importantly, they are all an example of a prospective clawback,146 
and they are all robust enough to operate as a deterrent to unfair behavior.147 
3. New Clawback Regulations in the 2011 CBA 
The 2011 Major League Baseball-Major League Baseball Players 
Association Collective Bargaining Agreement (“CBA”) mandates an 
unexpected change in minor league clawback provisions. While the exact 
details have not been publicly released, industry insiders state that specific 
 
 144. See infra Appendix B. 
 145. Quan Cosby, THE BASEBALL CUBE, http://www.thebaseballcube.com/players/pro 
file.asp?P=Quan-Cosby (last visited Oct. 22, 2011). 
 146. See Cherry & Wong, supra note 13, at 414–15 (discussing the benefits of prospective 
clawbacks). 
 147. Cf. Fried & Shilon, supra note 9, at 735 (calling for businesses to adopt “robust” 
clawbacks in executive compensation agreements). 
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guidelines will regulate signing bonus clawbacks.148 Importantly, the window 
for repayment will be limited according to the size of the bonus. For bonuses 
above $1,000,000, teams will be able to institute a five-year recoupment 
period, and for bonuses between $250,000 and $1,000,000, a four-year 
recoupment period will be available.149 For all other bonuses below this 
threshold, the maximum recoupment period will be three years.150 
This will force teams such as the Yankees to make changes to their 
clawback clauses. More importantly though, it demonstrates the importance 
that both MLB and the players’ union place on the clawback provisions. In 
short, the clawback has become an industry standard, recognized through 
collective bargaining by both sides of the industry. 
C. Limitations of the Clawback Provisions 
As discussed above, the clawback provisions were instituted to prevent 
players from retiring during the early years of their contracts. Considering the 
multitude of problems that can occur over a seven-year contract, however, one 
must question whether the clawback provision might also extend to other 
unexpected (and often undesirable) behavior. For instance, will the provisions 
extend to an inability to play due to visa problems or to instances of 
misconduct? 
1. The Story of Angel Villalona, a Top Prospect Turned Murder Suspect 
An exploration of the career of young prospect Angel Villalona 
demonstrates the potential magnitude of visa problems and possible 
misconduct. In 2006, the San Francisco Giants signed the sixteen-year-old 
Villalona to a contract with a $2.1 million signing bonus.151 The young 
Dominican possessed tremendous power and he quickly became the 
organization’s third-ranked prospect.152 
Once in the United States, Villalona began the process of assimilating to 
American culture.153 However, like many Latino players, Villalona returned to 
his home nation during the off-season. While visiting his mother in September 
 
 148. Telephone Interview with Erik Johnson, MLB Certified Player Agent, Platinum Sports & 
Entertainment (Jan. 4, 2012). 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Chris Haft, Villalona Appears Headed Back to Giants’ System, MLB.COM (Sept. 2, 
2011, 10:40 PM), http://sanfrancisco.giants.mlb.com/news/article.jsp?ymd=20110902&content_ 
id=24129456&vkey=news_sf&c_id=sf. 
 152. Id. 
 153. See Garret Broshuis, Villalona: Teammate Turned Murder Suspect, LIFE IN THE MINORS 
(Sept. 21, 2009), http://minorleaguelife.blogspot.com/2009/09/villalona-teammate-turned-mur 
der.html (describing Villalona’s reactions while navigating through “the labyrinth that is 
professional baseball”). 
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of 2009, he went to a nightclub that he frequented.154 According to reports, a 
fight broke out after a man refused to give Villalona his usual seat.155 The fight 
rolled out to the streets, and the man was eventually shot to death.156 
Villalona was quickly arrested and charged with murder.157 The police 
claimed he was the shooter while supporters insisted he was wrongly blamed 
because of his wealth.158 Either way, the once promising prospect, in which the 
Giants invested more than $2 million, was unable to play baseball. After being 
released on $14,000 bail, Villalona had his visa revoked by the U.S. Embassy 
and he could not travel.159 For two years, Villalona battled the charges far from 
any baseball field.160 Finally, all charges against him were dropped by 
prosecutors in 2011.161 
2. Would a Standard Clawback Provision Allow Recoupment in These 
Circumstances? 
Villalona now hopes to rejoin the Giants,162 who recently added him to 
their roster.163 Despite this, it is worth exploring whether the Giants might be 
able to recoup a portion of the $2.1 million signing bonus due to the lost time. 
A review of a Giants minor league contract reveals the use of a clawback 
provision identical to that used by the Yankees (Appendix A). Importantly, the 
provision states that “if Player fails to report for, or abandons Club without 
permission and is absent from Club for a material portion, or for at least two 
weeks, of any playing season . . . during the term of this Minor League 
Uniform Player Contract” recoupment may take place. The express language 
of this broad provision would probably cover Villalona’s situation. Even 
though he did not retire, as was the case with Jaroncyk, and even though he 
was not convicted of a crime, he certainly failed to report to his club for a 
material portion of a playing season, as he was out of baseball for two years. 
 
 154. Nanette Asimov & John Shea, Giants Prospect’s Friends Stunned, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 
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2011, at B3. 
 159. Jesse Sanchez, Villalona has U.S. Visa Revoked, MLB.COM (Nov. 13, 2009, 7:42 PM), 
http://mlb.mlb.com/news/article.jsp?ymd=20091113&content_id=7664896&vkey=news_mlb&fe
xt=.jsp&c_id=mlb. 
 160. Schulman & Shea, supra note 158. 
 161. Id. Additionally, Villalona reportedly paid the family of the victim $138,306. Id. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Chris Haft, Villalona among Giants 40-Man Roster Additions, MLB.COM (Nov. 19, 
2011, 2:15 AM), http://mlb.mlb.com/news/article.jsp?ymd=20111119&content_id=26005812& 
vkey=news_mlb&c_id=mlb. 
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Villalona might argue that this provision was not intended to cover such 
circumstances. Moreover, unusual and unanticipated events made him unable 
to report to his team. Yet the express language of the provision would still 
allow the Giants to recover a portion of Villalona’s signing bonus. He failed to 
receive permission prior to not reporting during the two-year period. 
Assumedly, the provision would also cover any other type of visa problems or 
other issues that make a player unable to report to an assignment. 
The provision fails to explicitly mention misconduct.164 For this reason, a 
player who experiences legal problems but who still reports to their work 
assignment would probably not be subjected to the clawback provision. For 
instance, had Villalona been arrested for a less egregious crime which did not 
result in the revocation of his visa, the clawback provision would not apply so 
long as he reported to work. However, if properly instituted, the broadly 
worded clawback can still operate as a deterrent to behavior that might be 
deemed misconduct, for misconduct might eventually lead to the inability to 
report to a work assignment. 
III.  ANALYSIS OF MINOR LEAGUE CLAWBACKS THROUGH CONTRACT LAW 
The above discussions demonstrate the utility of clawbacks in minor 
league contracts. But where do such clawbacks fit within contract law? And 
are they enforceable? These questions will be addressed below. 
A. Clawbacks Reallocate Risk and Discourage Opportunism 
One effective way of evaluating minor league clawback provisions comes 
by viewing these clauses through the lens of law and economics. After all, 
these prospective clawbacks are entirely about allocating the risk upfront, at 
the early stages of contract formation. As noted above, teams invest large sums 
of money in raw talent, yet these investments remain risky.165 Not only must 
teams bear the risk of injury, but, without these provisions, they must bear the 
risk of a player simply choosing to walk away from the game.166 
Under the default rules, a player can leave at any time after receiving his 
large signing bonus and still retain the full amount of the bonus. Contract 
remedies such as unjust enrichment and breach of good faith would not allow 
 
 164. Minor league UPCs do contain a misconduct provision in section XIX of the UPCs, 
entitled “Termination.” Minor League Uniform Player Contract (Nov. 11, 2011) (on file with 
author). This provision allows a team to terminate a contract if a player fails to conform to “high 
standards of good citizenship and good sportsmanship.” Id. It also applies if, among other things, 
a player fails “to keep himself in first-class physical condition.” Id. However, the mere 
termination of a contract would not allow for the recoupment of any signing bonus already paid to 
a player. 
 165. Dobrow, supra note 5. 
 166. See discussion supra Part II.A.2. 
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any recoupment. Yet almost any outside observer would find that there is some 
inherent unfairness in this.167 Even though the bonus was provided as an 
incentive to sign a contract, the club expected the player to put forth a good 
faith effort to develop to his full potential. 
These clawback provisions allow teams to reset the default rules.168 The 
risk of walking away from the game is shifted from the team to the player. The 
player is in the best position to prevent this behavior, so the risk re-allocates to 
the least-cost avoider. 
While legal and economic theory is often used to discourage negligent 
contracting, it can also be used to discourage opportunism in contracting.169 As 
Professor Cohen states, contracting parties are vulnerable both because they 
cannot foresee all possible problems that might arise under the contract and 
because parties perform obligations sequentially rather than simultaneously.170 
The latter factor is particularly important in promoting opportunism.171 
As applied to minor league contracts, it is impossible for either party to 
foresee everything that will happen during the seven-year term of the 
agreement. This is true both on the player’s side and the team’s side. The team 
might sign a veteran free agent or sign other amateur players at the same 
position as the young player receiving the signing bonus, which might impede 
 
 167. Some inside observers and player advocates would argue that no unfairness is present 
due to MLB’s efforts to artificially depress signing bonuses and the miniscule salaries paid to 
minor league players. For a discussion on the effort to depress signing bonuses, see supra Part 
II.A.1. For a discussion on minor league salaries, see Broshuis, supra note 135. 
 168. The term “default rules” used in this sense merely means the rules that govern the 
contract if no provision is adopted to stipulate otherwise. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling 
Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989) 
(defining default rules and describing a system for assigning efficient default rules). Given that 
the default in the current system of minor league bonuses negatively affects the team, this might 
be termed a penalty default. According to Professors Ayres and Gertner, “[p]enalty defaults are 
designed to give at least one party to the contract an incentive to contract around the default rule 
and therefore to choose affirmatively the contract provision they prefer.” Id. at 91. However, true 
penalty defaults are intentionally set in this manner to provide such an incentive, id., whereas the 
current default rules for minor league bonuses seem to simply have been adopted arbitrarily out of 
custom. 
 169. For a discussion of the traditional focus on negligent contracting and the ability of law 
and economics to be applied to opportunistic contracting, see Cohen, supra note 8, at 952. Cohen 
defines opportunism as “any contractual conduct by one party contrary to the other party’s 
reasonable expectations based on the parties’ agreement, contractual norms, or conventional 
morality.” Id. at 957. See also RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 93–94 (6th 
ed. 2003) (describing the problem of opportunism in contract law and stating the “fundamental 
function of contract law (and recognized as such at least since Hobbes’s day) is to deter people 
from behaving opportunistically toward their contracting parties . . .”). 
 170. Cohen, supra note 8, at 954–55; see also POSNER, supra note 169, at 93 (stating that “the 
problem of contract opportunism arise[s] from the sequential character of economic activity”). 
 171. Cohen, supra note 8, at 955. 
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his path to the major leagues.172 The player might also suffer from injuries,173 
which would hinder his development. These problems present unforeseeable 
challenges, and both team and player assume some risk due to these 
unforeseeable challenges. 
Yet lack of simultaneous contractual obligations also creates the risk of 
opportunism. The team pays the signing bonus in advance, typically paying 
half of the signing bonus almost immediately upon the player’s signing and the 
second half during the next year.174 A major contractual obligation for the team 
is therefore fulfilled early in the contract. Yet the team does not expect a 
benefit from this contract until several years later, as time must be allotted for 
the development of the player.175 If a player chooses to retire during this 
developmental time period, he may do so. Consequently, it creates an 
environment ripe for opportunism. 
According to Professor Cohen, one party “may intend to mislead or 
deceive the other party from the beginning of the relationship, before the other 
party has invested in it.”176 It is impossible to read a player’s mind, and a 
player such as Jaroncyk, for instance, may know from the very beginning that 
his heart is not in baseball. He may sign the contract simply to obtain the 
lucrative signing bonus and then retire as soon as he receives this bonus. At the 
least, the team runs the risk that the player will simply not enjoy professional 
baseball as much as he had imagined and will have a change of heart. Though 
this latter scenario might be termed unintentional opportunism, it is still 
opportunism, and perhaps bad faith. 
The default rules do little to discourage this opportunistic behavior,177 as 
most of the risk allocates to the team. The addition of the clawback provision 
re-allocates this risk to the player, who is both the least-cost avoider and the 
potentially opportunistic party.178 In this manner, potential opportunism is 
discouraged. 
 
 172. Cf. Jason Martinez, About, MLBDEPTHCHARTS.COM, http://www.mlbdepthcharts.com/ 
2009/03/site-contributors-jason-martinez-san.html (last visited Apr. 4, 2012) (explaining that the 
website is devoted strictly to the ever-changing world of MLB depth charts). 
 173. Cf. Nate Silver & Will Carroll, The Injury Nexus, BASEBALL PROSPECTUS (Feb. 26, 
2003), http://www.baseballprospectus.com/article.php?articleid=1658 (providing a statistical 
breakdown of the rate of injuries in pitchers and finding that pitchers under the age of 24 are more 
prone to elbow and shoulder injuries). 
 174. Darren Heitner, Value of Signing Bonuses, SPORTS AGENT BLOG (July 24, 2006), 
http://www.sportsagentblog.com/2006/07/24/value-of-signing-bonuses/. 
 175. See Ben Lindbergh, Overthinking It, BASEBALL PROSPECTUS (Feb. 22, 2011), 
http://www.baseballprospectus.com/article.php?articleid=13018 (computing the average age of 
major league debuts and the amount of previous minor league experience for prospects). 
 176. Cohen, supra note 8, at 955. 
 177. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 168, at 98. 
 178. For a discussion on when a party is both a least-cost avoider and a “most-likely-
opportunist,” see Cohen, supra note 8, at 979. 
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B. Clawback Provisions as a Good Business Practice 
Although these provisions discourage opportunism, some might still 
question the utility of these provisions. After all, by using these provisions, a 
team exerts pressure on a player to remain at a job against his will. This 
assumedly results in an unhappy employee, and most personnel managers 
would agree that an unhappy employee is not a good employee.179 Moreover, 
one person’s unhappiness can easily spread to others, and the development of 
other talented young players might be hindered.180 
It is also questionable whether a player seeking to walk away will ever 
develop to his full potential. As Jaroncyk, Desme, and other examples 
demonstrate, young players sometimes realize that baseball simply is not for 
them. Once a player realizes this, it is unlikely they will enthusiastically work 
to fully develop their skills. If the player is pressured to stay, the team will 
continue to invest time in the player’s development and will continue to give 
the player opportunities. The time and opportunities invested in the player will 
cost the team money.181 Moreover, these resources could be devoted to other, 
more committed players. Consequently, perhaps the most efficient solution 
would allow the team and player to simply sever their relationship. 
However, human beings are prone to attitudinal changes as situations 
change.182 This is no doubt especially true of young, talented athletes who are 
still in the midst of identity formation.183 Perhaps the presence of a clawback 
provision persuading a player to remain within an organization for a longer 
time will result in the player experiencing a change-of-heart. For instance, one 
of the Kansas City Royals’ top prospects, Danny Duffy, recently sought to 
leave the game while attending spring training in 2010.184 Instead of altogether 
quitting the game, the Royals persuaded Duffy to take a short leave of 
 
 179. See, e.g., Lise M. Saari & Timothy A. Judge, Employee Attitudes and Job Satisfaction, 
43 HUMAN RES. MGMT. 395, 398 (2004) (reviewing research on employee satisfaction and 
performance). 
 180. See Rob Stein, Happiness Can Spread Among People Like a Contagion, Study Indicates, 
WASH. POST, Dec. 5, 2008, at A8 (stating that unhappiness spreads from person to person, though 
not as strongly as happiness). 
 181. See Andrew Zimbalist, Reflections on Salary Shares and Salary Caps, 11 J. OF SPORTS 
ECON. 17, 18 (2010) (noting that MLB teams spend an average of $20.6 million each year on 
player development). 
 182. See, e.g., David C. Funder & Daniel J. Ozer, Behavior as a Function of the Situation, 44 
J. OF PERSONALITY AND SOC. PSYCHOL. 107, 108–110 (1983) (providing an overview of some of 
the more famous examples of situationism). 
 183. Cf. Peter Kaufman & Kenneth A. Feldman, Forming Identities in College: A 
Sociological Approach, 45 RES. IN HIGHER EDUC. 463, 488 (2004) (studying the effect of the 
college experience on identity formation). 
 184. J.J. Cooper, Royals Lefty Duffy Quits Baseball, BASEBALL AM. (Mar. 24, 2010, 10:57 
AM), http://www.baseballamerica.com/blog/prospects/2010/03/royals-lefty-duffy-quits-baseball/. 
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absence.185 After this leave of absence, Duffy had a change-of-heart and 
returned to the team.186 The next year he was pitching in the major leagues.187 
Clawbacks have the potential to facilitate more success stories similar to 
Duffy.188 Even though the provisions pressure a player to remain in the game 
against his will, they might allow time for attitudinal change. The stress of a 
previous bad season might pass if success is again found, and homesickness 
might fade as a player matures. Moreover, the provisions simply persuade a 
player to fulfill an expected part of the bargain.189 In short, the use of clawback 
provisions is a sound business practice within baseball. 
C. Enforceability of Clawback Provisions in Baseball UPCs 
As previously described, these clawback provisions efficiently re-allocate 
the risk to the party who is both the least-cost avoider and the potentially 
opportunistic party. Despite this efficiency, questions might still arise as to the 
enforceability of these contract provisions, as these types of clawbacks have 
never been challenged.190 Specifically, the provisions might be challenged 
under the doctrine of unconscionability due to the contractual circumstances 
surrounding the bargaining process. 
According to the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, courts may choose 
not to enforce an unconscionable contract.191 While the Restatement does not 
define unconscionability,192 the official comment section places importance on 
the setting, purpose, and effect of the contract.193 
When analyzing unconscionability, many courts focus on the presence of 
unreasonably favorable terms or the absence of meaningful choice.194 These 
 
 185. Rustin Dodd, The Return of Danny Duffy. . . (and Why the Royals May Need to Open a 
Leftorium), K.C. STAR (June 3, 2010, 5:57 PM), http://royalsblog.kansascity.com/?q=node/546. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Steve Gardner, Royals Calling Up Pitching Prospect Danny Duffy, USA TODAY, 
http://content.usatoday.com/communities/fantasywindup/post/2011/05/royals-calling-up-pitching-
prospect-danny-duffy/1 (last updated May 18, 2011). 
 188. During my playing career with the San Francisco Giants, I saw first-hand the ability of 
clawbacks to bring forth such a possibility. Similar to Duffy, one of the Giants’ prospects—who 
will remain anonymous—sought to leave the game during spring training. He had only pitched in 
the minor leagues for a single season, and when he informed the Giants’ organization of his 
intentions, he was told that he would have to pay back a large portion of his bonus due to 
language in his contract. Upon hearing this, he remained with the organization, and he ultimately 
became a successful major league pitcher. 
 189. See supra Part III.A. 
 190. Non-disclosure clawbacks have been challenged. Melone, supra note 9, at 70. 
 191. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (1979). 
 192. Id. The UCC also fails to define unconscionability in its codification of the doctrine. 
U.C.C. § 2-302 (1977). 
 193. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 cmt. a (1979). 
 194. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 4.28, at 301 (4th ed. 2004). 
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two concepts have often been called substantive unconscionability and 
procedural unconscionability.195 Courts typically require at least some 
evidence of both elements in order for a contract provision to be deemed 
unconscionable.196 
The substantive element “focuses on overly harsh or one-sided results.”197 
The procedural element, on the other hand, focuses on oppression or 
surprise.198 Oppression in contracting derives from an inequality of bargaining 
power resulting in an absence of meaningful choice,199 while surprise is found 
when terms are deceptively hidden200 or when a party is incapable of 
understanding the terms.201 
In examining these contract provisions, one immediate procedural problem 
arises from the bargaining circumstances. Since MLB teams have collectively 
acted to limit a player’s choices through the implementation of the draft, the 
players’ relative bargaining power has diminished. After all, this was the very 
reason behind the implementation of the draft, as MLB hoped that the 
diminished bargaining power would result in depressed signing bonuses.202 
Further evidence of the players’ lower relative bargaining power is found 
due to their ability—or often inability—to secure representation. The NCAA 
places strict regulations on a player’s ability to obtain representation during the 
draft process through its “No Agent” Rule.203 Many top players still retain 
agents such as Boras to bargain for them,204 but teams know that players risk 
 
 195. Id.; see also Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Code—the Emperor’s New 
Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485, 487 (1967) (delineating between substantive and procedural 
unconscionability). 
 196. FARNSWORTH, supra note 194, § 4.28, at 302. Courts will allow for a sliding scale 
between the two elements, for if one element is found in great magnitude, sometimes less 
evidence of the other element will be required. Id. 
 197. Gatton v. T-mobile, 61 Cal. Rptr. 3d 344, 356 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007). 
 198. Id. at 352. 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Weaver v. Am. Oil Co., 276 N.E.2d 144, 148 (Ind. 1971). 
 202. See supra Part II.A.1. 
 203. NCAA bylaws allow a player to obtain advice from an “advisor,” but the advisor cannot 
have direct contact with any MLB team on the player’s behalf. Consequently, if an advisor does 
any negotiating, the player will lose his amateur status even if he does not sign a professional 
contract. See Richard T. Karcher, The NCAA’s Regulations Related to the Use of Agents in the 
Sport of Baseball: Are the Rules Detrimental to the Best Interest of the Amateur Athlete?, 7 
VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 215 (2005); Brandon D. Morgan, Oliver v. NCAA: NCAA’s No Agent 
Rule Called Out, but Remains Safe, 17 SPORTS LAW. J. 303 (2010). 
 204. Aaron Fitt, Nebraska’s Ehlers Suspended for 60 Percent of Season, BASEBALL AM. 
(Mar. 9, 2011, 1:05 PM), http://www.baseballamerica.com/blog/college/2011/03/nebraskas-
ehlers-suspended-for-60-percent-of-season/ (stating that “major league scouting directors and 
college coaches have reaffirmed to Baseball America time and time again, nearly every drafted 
player has an adviser who has contact with professional clubs on his behalf . . .”). 
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their amateur status (and NCAA eligibility) if they fail to come to terms with 
the team.205 This limits a player’s options, as a team may use this as a 
bargaining chip during negotiations, resulting in reduced bargaining power. 
While top players employ representation, many lower level players elect 
not to use representation when going through the draft. Due to their lack of 
representation (and lower level of talent) these players have far less bargaining 
power than top picks. Yet, they still will be subjected to the clawback 
provision. 
Although there is no evidence that agents have attempted to negotiate these 
clawback provisions out of contracts, one irony is that the top picks—for 
whom the clawbacks were implemented—are in the greatest position to 
negotiate the removal of these provisions. They have the high level of talent 
that leads to increased leverage, and they usually employ representation to aid 
in bargaining. The lower picks, however, have no ability to negotiate such a 
removal. 
One could easily state from these facts that an inequality in bargaining 
power is present, especially for lower picks. This results in a lack of 
meaningful choice. However, unequal bargaining power alone does not make a 
contract provision unconscionable.206 While it satisfies procedural 
unconscionability, substantive unconscionability must also be found. 
Substantive unconscionability requires overly harsh or one-sided results, 
and the best argument for this might be found in the lower picks. These players 
often are not deemed prospects and have a far lower chance of making it to the 
major leagues than the top picks. Yet the implementation of clawback 
provisions pressure these players to continue to play in the minor leagues until 
 
 205. Pitcher Logan Ehlers was suspended for sixty percent of his 2011 collegiate season after 
violating the “no agent” rule prior to enrolling at the University of Nebraska. Id. Amateur pitcher 
Andy Oliver rejected an offer of $390,000 after being drafted by the Minnesota Twins in 2006. 
Morgan, supra note 203, at 303–04. He subsequently played at Oklahoma State, but when the 
NCAA learned in 2008 that Oliver had representation through the prior draft process, they ruled 
him ineligible to play. Id. at 304–05. Shortly thereafter, a similar situation developed with pitcher 
James Paxton after talks broke down between his agent, Scott Boras, and the Toronto Blue Jays, 
and he attempted to re-enroll at the University of Kentucky. Richard G. Johnson, Submarining 
Due Process: How the NCAA Uses its Restitution Rule to Deprive College Athletes of their Right 
of Access to the Courts…Until Oliver v. NCAA, 11 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 459, 501–03, 579 
(2010). 
 206. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 cmt. d (1979) (“A bargain is not 
unconscionable merely because the parties to it are unequal in bargaining position, nor even 
because the inequality results in an allocation of risks to the weaker party. But gross inequality of 
bargaining power, together with terms unreasonably favorable to the stronger party, may confirm 
indications that the transaction involved elements of deception or compulsion, or may show that 
the weaker party had no meaningful choice, no real alternative, or did not in fact assent . . . to the 
unfair terms.”); FARNSWORTH, supra note 194, § 4.28, at 302 (“[I]nequality of bargaining power 
is not by itself enough . . . .”). 
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a) the team relieves them of their duties, or b) their contract expires. The use of 
the longer clawback provision (exhibited by the Yankees) effectively 
constrains their mobility for fear of the economic recoupment of their bonus. 
Many would say that such an employment situation results in at least some 
unfairness. 
Even when the long-term clawback provision is applied to these lower 
picks, however, the level of unfairness does not reach the point of an overly 
harsh or one-sided bargain. After all, the clawback provision merely ensures 
that the player will perform his duties as expected under the contract. The 
provision acts as a condition,207 and it only becomes operable when a player 
fails to perform his obligations under the employment contract. Moreover, 
clawbacks have now become part of the latest CBA.208 As a result, the 
recoupment period will be limited to three years for the lower picks, which will 
eliminate some of the harshness involved. In certain circumstances, some 
unfairness might still result, but it will not be enough to meet the standards of 
substantive unconscionability. 
Courts typically require both procedural and substantive unconscionability. 
While substantial evidence of procedural unconscionability arises under these 
bargaining conditions, there exists little evidence of substantive 
unconscionability. Consequently, these provisions—even the harshest of them 
as applied to the weakest of players—will be upheld. 
IV.  APPLICATIONS OUTSIDE OF MINOR LEAGUE BASEBALL 
The use of clawback provisions in minor league baseball demonstrates 
their contractual utility, especially in an environment ripe for opportunism. But 
will this utility extend to other business arenas, such as executive 
compensation? 
A. Executive Compensation: Another Environment Ripe for Opportunism 
Similar to highly talented baseball prospects, experienced business 
executives are a scarce commodity. Due to their scarcity and talent, they 
command large bonuses.209 Also, as will be demonstrated below, the potential 
for opportunism exists in the realm of executive compensation just as it exists 
in minor league baseball. 
Potential opportunism in executive compensation stems in part from the 
agency problem created by the separation of ownership and control in publicly 
 
 207. See Cherry & Wong, supra note 13, at 416–17 (discussing how clawback provisions 
operate as conditions). 
 208. Telephone Interview with Erik Johnson, supra note 148. 
 209. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 702–04 (Del. Ch. 2005) 
(describing Disney’s efforts through a bidding war to land a talented executive who ultimately 
received $130 million after only fourteen months on the job). 
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traded companies, which places executives in a position to take advantage of 
their power.210 Moreover, executives often exert great influence over the board 
of directors, which limits executive oversight.211 Even when businesses utilize 
pay committees comprised of independent directors, the great influence of the 
executive might still be felt.212 After all, managers influence the appointment 
of independent directors, and independent directors are influenced by board 
dynamics that reduce arms-length bargaining.213 Such an environment 
encourages opportunistic behavior, as it places the executive in a position to 
take advantage of another party’s vulnerabilities.214 
As a potential solution, many companies attempt to align compensation to 
company success through performance metrics.215 However, opportunism can 
still remain a problem. For instance, if performance metrics are too simplistic, 
or if too much cash or too many equity options are linked to short-term 
performance, then opportunistic behavior is still incentivized.216 In such a 
situation, even the most honest executive might be tempted to maximize short-
term gains at the expense of long-term company goals. 
B. Like in Baseball, Executive Opportunism Can Be Deterred Through 
Clawbacks 
Just as the institution of clawback provisions in minor league contracts 
deter potential opportunism, properly drafted clawback provisions in executive 
compensation contracts can operate similarly. To do so, the provisions should 
be drafted carefully, since executive compensation packages are more 
complicated than minor league contracts. Annual cash and equity earnings 
should be covered, but long-term incentives and deferral programs should also 
be covered.217 Moreover, the triggering act must be broader than the material 
 
 210. See M. Todd Henderson, Paying CEOs in Bankruptcy: Executive Compensation When 
Agency Costs Are Low, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1543, 1545 (2007) (describing the “managerial 
power school” of executive compensation that believes that “pay practices represent a taking 
advantage of . . . the agency problems in large public firms”). 
 211. Fried & Shilon, supra note 9, at 733. 
 212. Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Jesse M. Fried & David I. Walker, Managerial Power and Rent 
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 213. Id. 
 214. See Posner, supra note 169, at 93–95 (describing different scenarios that allow a person 
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 215. See Susan J. Stabile, Motivating Executives: Does Performance-Based Compensation 
Positively Affect Managerial Performance?, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 227, 233–241 
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 216. See Heineman Jr., supra note 76 (calling for an end to “naked” cash bonuses and 
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 217. Id. 
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restatement of financials required by the Dodd-Frank Act.218 This 
recommendation stems from the fact that even a small error in a firm’s 
earnings might lead to an executive receiving substantial excess pay if a 
performance threshold is met.219 Yet the small error might not be deemed 
material, so no restatement would be required, and no Dodd-Frank clawback 
would be triggered.220 
C. Potential Obstacles to Implementation 
One potential obstacle to implementing broader clawbacks in executive 
compensation contracts emerges from the fact that, unlike young baseball 
prospects, business executives bargain for their contracts in a purely open 
market system. As discussed above, the use of a draft system allows a baseball 
prospect to only bargain with a single team. No such restriction exists with 
executives. Furthermore, the same executive power that leads to potential 
opportunism also makes the implementation of more robust clawbacks 
problematic. After all, an executive with great sway over directors—and even 
sway over independent directors on a pay committee—might successfully 
resist any implementation that goes beyond the legal requirements. 
While these obstacles might make implementation more problematic, 
clawbacks are worth the battle required to overcome the obstacles. Ultimately, 
a well-drafted and robust clawback provision has the ability to systematically 
deter opportunistic behavior by holding senior leadership accountable while 
simultaneously promoting long-term growth, sustainability, proper risk taking, 
and balanced senior leadership.221 Consequently, the utility of clawback 
provisions necessitates their inclusion.222 
CONCLUSION 
Although the use of clawbacks has grown tremendously in the past fifteen 
years, commentators still question their utility. However, the use of clawback 
provisions in minor league baseball contracts demonstrates their ability to deter 
opportunism. Furthermore, clawbacks can be used to deter opportunism in 
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other arenas, such as executive compensation. If drafted properly and instituted 
prospectively, a robust clawback provision can effectively reassign risk to the 
least cost avoider, and can simultaneously allow desired behavior such as 
proper risk-taking by an executive. 
As one court stated not long ago, “[a]spirational ideals of good corporate 
governance practices for boards of directors that go beyond the minimal legal 
requirements of the corporation law are highly desirable, often tend to benefit 
stockholders, sometimes reduce litigation and can usually help directors avoid 
liability.”223 Indeed, properly drafted prospective clawbacks that go beyond the 
minimal legal requirements do possess such mystical potential. Their usage 
should not only continue but increase. 
GARRETT R. BROSHUIS 
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APPENDIX 
Appendix A: New York Yankees clawback provision from a 2009 minor 
league UPC 
Signing Bonus 
Subject to the conditions set forth below, Player shall receive a signing bonus, 
only upon approval of this contract by the Office of the Commissioner of 
Baseball, which shall be payable as shown below. 
If Player fails to report for, or abandons Club without permission and is absent 
from Club for a material portion, or for at least two weeks, of any playing 
season (which includes the championship season, any training required by 
Club in preparation for such championship season and any post-season that the 
team or affiliate to which the Player is assigned participates) during the term of 
this Minor League Uniform Player Contract (“UPC”), 
1) Player shall relinquish and forfeit any right to, and Club shall not be 
obligated to pay, any portion of the amount not yet paid pursuant to the 
payment schedule set forth in this signing bonus provision and 
2) Player shall immediately return and refund to Club, and relinquish and 
forfeit any right to, that portion of the signing bonus already paid to 
Player by Club, regardless of the year of payment, that exceeds the 
amount of signing bonus already paid to Player by Club (i) multiplied 
by the number of championship seasons Player reported to, and did not 
subsequently abandon without permission, Club and (ii) divided by the 
number of championship seasons covered by the term of this UPC. 
Appendix B: San Diego Padres clawback provision from a 2011 minor league 
UPC 
Signing Bonus 
Subject to the conditions set forth below, Player shall receive a signing bonus, 
only upon approval of this contract by the Office of the Commissioner of 
Baseball, which shall be payable as shown below: 
If Player fails to report for, or abandons Club without permission and is absent 
from Club for a material portion, or for at least two weeks, of any playing 
season (which includes the championship season, any training required by 
Club in preparation for such championship season and any post-season that the 
team or affiliate to which the Player is assigned participates) during the first 3 
(three) playing seasons of the term of this Minor League Uniform Player 
Contract (“UPC”) (the “Recoupment Period”), 
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1) Player shall relinquish and forfeit any right to, and Club shall not be 
obligated to pay, any portion of the amount not yet paid pursuant to the 
payment schedule set forth in this signing bonus provision and 
2) Player shall immediately return and refund to Club, and relinquish and 
forfeit any right to, that portion of the signing bonus already paid to 
Player by Club, regardless of the year of payment, that exceeds the 
amount of signing bonus already paid to Player by Club (i) multiplied 
by the number of championship seasons Player reported to, and did not 
subsequently abandon without permission, Club and (ii) divided by the 
number of championship seasons covered by the term of this UPC. 
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